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Credibility, Agency, and the Interaction Order 
Philip Manning 
Cleveland State University 
There are two ways of reading Coffman-as a theorist of trust and ritual 
accommodation, that is, as a theorist of the interaction order, or as a theo­
rist of deception. I suggest a way of making these two readings compatible, 
by arguing that Coffman was interested in what I call the "production of 
credibility." Credibility is the quality of being believable, and this quality is 
integral to both trust and deception. Viewed in this way, Coffman explored 
the ways in which people make their actions convincing to other people. 
Although Coffman's analysis of the interaction order did not need a theory 
of the self, his work actually contains two quite different theories of the 
self: one linked to role analysis, one to his analysis of mental illness. I argue 
for the latter at the expense of the former. I conclude that Coffman both ini­
tiated substantive work about the interaction order and contributed to a 
synthesis of a theory of the interaction order and a theory of the self. 
Despite the many illustrations, telling examples, and subtle observations, Goffman 
was an abstract thinker who sought to expose the most general characteristics of 
face-to-face interaction. As he stated in his Presidential Address, the analysis of 
face-to-face interaction is as much an abstraction as the "behavior" of corporations 
or New York crime statistics (1983b:9). Goffman uses all examples to serve his clas-
sificatory schemes. If his examples are stripped away, then what remains is an ac-
count of the micro-sociological world with a high level of abstraction. This is quite 
clear in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), in the preface of which 
Goffman himself described the book as outlining a general framework, with the re-
sult that much of it is "necessarily abstract." However, it is also true that even his 
ethnographic studies were abstract and self-consciously theoretical. For example, 
Asylums (1961) is sometimes poorly understood as simply a case study of St. Eliza-
beth's hospital in the 1950s. Actually, it is an ethnography of the concept of the total 
institution (Manning 1992:17-18; 1999b). As such, it very generally extends ideas 
Goffman derived from some of Everett Hughes's lectures at the University of Chicago 
(Burns 1992). Part of Goffman's skill lay in integrating a suggestive vocabulary and 
persuasive examples into elaborate and necessarily abstract theoretical classifications. 
Goffman liked to masquerade as someone who knew next to nothing about the 
abstract world of social theory, which he sometimes portrayed as part of the alien 
world of European sociology and hence literally and metaphor.ically miles away 
from his Canadian and American background. Wrong has tried to warn us against 
any tendency to minimize Goffman's theoretical sophistication: 
Goffman stories are legion among those who knew him at all well, although 
mine go back farther than just about anyone else's. I shall confine myself to a few 
recollections about his intellectual outlook. The widespread notion that Erving 
was an inspired naif, a novelist manque with unusual powers of social observa-
tion, is utterly wrong. He already had an acute ~nd far-ranging theoretical mind 
when I met him [in Toronto]. (1990:9) . 
Wrong points out here that Goffman was clearly knowledgeable about European 
social theory before he began his graduate work at Chicago. He wrote his disserta-
tion (1953)-at least in part-in Paris, and it contains many references to existential 
debates of the 1950s.1 He was similarly knowledgeable about French social theory 
in general, as writers who found an underlying structuralism in his work discovered, 
sometimes at their expense. Some of Goffman's papers and books also indicate his 
familiarity with philosophical issues, notably in the beginning of Frame Analysis 
(1974) and in the jokey title "Felicity's Condition" (1983a), which makes sense only 
in the context of the philosophy of not only Austin but also Wittgenstein, Grice, and 
Searle. Goffman had, in fact, participated in a seminar with Searle at Berkeley and, 
hence, learned part of the philosophical trade from the inside. It is instructive to 
note that Searle (1995,1998) is now investigating some of the core issues in the phi-
losophy of the social sciences, in part through a reading of, and in a sense a return 
to, George Herbert Mead. 
THE INTERACTION ORDER AND DECEPTION 
The most influential contemporary reading of Goffman's social theory portrays him 
as a theorist of the interaction order, of the ritual accommodation of face-to-face in-
teraction (Drew and Wootten 1988; Giddens 1984, 1987). Goffman in fact coined 
the term "interaction order" in the conclusion of his dissertation (1953) and then 
highlighted its importance for him by recycling it as the title of his Presidential Ad-
dress. In much the same way that each of Goffman's prefaces serves as a general in-
troduction to a particular book, the Presidential Address is a preface and introduc-
tion to his work as a whole. Clearly, an important part of this introduction is his 
attempt to analyze the world of face-to-face interaction as a separate domain wor-
thy of independent study. The interaction order consists of "systems of enabling 
conventions" that render public conduct orderly and predictable and is sustained by 
shared cognitive and normative presuppositions (Goffman 1983b:5-9). Sociologists 
can understand the interaction order in part through empathy and introspection, 
because the normative conventions of our day-to-day lives are "anchored" in sub-
jective feelings that we not only share but which have been "worn smooth by con-
stant repetition" (1983b:9). 
Therefore, the very orderliness and interpretive accessibility of the interaction 
order suggests its viability as an independent domain for analysis. Many mundane 
tasks require tacit agreement about the ground rules of the interaction order. Con-
sider some of the multiple and sometimes simultaneous tasks accomplished during 
face-to-face interaction: the preservation of efficient pedestrian traffic flow, the 
management of environments populated by strangers, and the achievement of shared 
understandings. Goffman (1983b:6) believed that these accomplishments are made 
possible by a set of "arrangements which allow a great diversity of projects and in-
tents to be realized through unthinking recourse to procedural forms." 
. This way of reading his work typifies what I would like to call the "European 
Goffman" who, as Giddens (1987) puts it, is striving to be a "systematic social theo-
rist." The European Goffman had almost Parsonian ambitions, aiming to be maxi-
mally inclusive in his account of the interaction order. Reading Goffman in this way 
makes his ideas compatible with Parsons's account of socialization and the internal-
ization of norms as forms of social control (see Parsons 1951:297-321). Giddens 
(1984) integrated this Goffman into structuration theory and awarded Goffman an 
important role in his reconceptualization of the relationship between structure and 
agency. In Giddens's work, the European Goffman emerges as the principal theo-
rist of "practical consciousness," that is, of the taken-for-granted, nondiscursive 
practices of everyday life (see especially Giddens 1984). 
However, I want to suggest that an "American" Goffman has emerged as a con-
troversial transitional figure between a Hughesian version of Chicago sociology and 
the emergence of ethnomethodology.2 The American Goffman did not, as Goffman 
(1983b:2) himself realized, overwhelm his colleagues by the strength of his argu-
ments. On the contrary, he offended different groups in different ways. For Hughes, 
who had a well-documented strong dislike for social theory (see Fine 1995), Goffman 
had drifted into barren theoretical speculation and away from empirical work. Never-
theless, Goffman described himself as a "Hughesian urban ethnographer" (quoted in 
Verhoeven 1993:318), although he later added in the same interview: "I am really on 
that side, closer to the structural functionalists, like Parsons3 or Merton" (p. 324). 
Arguably, this ability to make creative use of the different influences of both symbolic 
interactionism and structural functionalism made Goffman's work powerful, and po-
sitioned him as one of the leading post-World War II American sociologists. 
Many ethnomethodologists believed, however, that Goffman's work failed to an-
alyze the complexities of the actual procedures used in day-to-day life. Ethnomethod-
ologists often consider his descriptions to be too general to account for the com-
plexity of naturally occurring social interaction (see, e.g., Schegloff 1988). 
This rough-and-ready distinction between a European and an American Goff-
man might explain why no distinct Goffman school of sociology has emerged: his 
work can be read in different ways, producing diverse uses for his ideas. Alternative 
explanations for the lack of a Goffman school also exist; for example, he did not 
train many graduate students (Fine and Manning 2000) and was not always consid-
erate to those whom he did (see Schegloff 1992). Nevertheless, a kind of Goffman 
school has emerged in the prolific ethnographic work of Gary Fine (see especially 
1983, 1987, 1996), as well as Elijah Anderson (1978, 1990), Lyn Lofland (1998), 
Carol B. Gardner (1995), Spencer Cahill (1987; Cahill and Eggleston 1994), Greg 
Smith (1997), and others. All of these writers have extended Goffman's theoretical 
analysis of the interaction order, worked in ways similar to Goffman, and adhered 
to the same scholarly tradition. 
More contemporary ethnographic studies of the kind that Fine, and recently Du-
neier (1992), championed are needed to show whether Goffman's largely urban 
analysis of the interaction order equally applies to contemporary suburban landscapes. 
These landscapes contain homogenized and often enclosed environments of shop-
ping malls, sports arenas, and sequestered living spaces. Pedestrian traffic flow-the 
locus of civil inattention-is no longer primarily urban and outside. In fact, there 
are many communities without sidewalks. Rather, the baseline case of pedestrian 
traffic flow now probably occurs in the mall and the arena. Lofland's (1998) most re-
cent work provides an important step toward answering this question. She has iden-
tified five key characteristics of social interaction: cooperative motility, civil inatten-
tion, audience role prominence, restrained helpfulness, and civility toward diversity 
pinpoint elements that are particularly applicable to the suburban environments of 
shopping malls, theme parks, and sports arenas (see esp. pp. 25-34).4 
Although it has limitations, the "European" reading of Goffman as principally a 
theorist of the interaction order offers a useful way of highlighting part of his con-
tribution to sociological thinking. By contrast, the "American" reading of Goffman 
raises a different but also important set of issues concerning his relationship to both 
symbolic interactionism and Hughes (see Jaworski 2000) and to ethnomethodology 
and Garfinkel. Giddens's reading assumes that Goffman's ideas are easily compati-
ble with Garfinkel's. We need to examine this assumption carefully. Although both 
Goffman and Garfinkel are "micro" sociologists (but see Schegloff 1990 for a dis-
cussion of this), their approaches differ. Garfinkel's Wittgensteinian emphasis on 
the elucidation of social practices as contingent achievements seems to preclude the 
attempt at systematic social theory that Giddens (1987) identified in Goffman's work. 
However, a substantive problem arises with the view of Goffman as primarily a 
theorist of the interaction order: much of his work did not, directly at least, address 
the interaction order, trust, or ritual accommodation. Rather, Goffman's works an-
alyzed deception and thus contributed to what Ricoeur (1970:30) called the "herme-
neutics of suspicion." Lyman and Scott (1970:29-70) have written extensively about 
the connection between game theory and deception in Goffman's sociology. Goff-
man's first published papers initiated his long-term interest in deception. "Symbols 
of Class Status" (1951) analyzed the ways in which symbols can be misused, and 
"On Cooling the Mark Out" (1952) analyzed all social situations as confidence tricks. 
In the "Symbols" paper, Goffman argued that because class symbols represent a 
"complex of social qualifications" (p. 126) that are often hard to substantiate, they 
are particularly vulnerable to misuse. As a result, legitimate status holders seek to 
find ways to authenticate and hence protect the symbols they rely on to distinguish 
bona fide members of their group from imposters. Goffman outlined six devices 
that are intended to prevent a person from misrepresenting his or her class (pp. 
297-301). He also described the role of "curator groups" in the maintenance of the 
"machinery" of status. However, as Goffman emphasized, the very devices used to 
maintain class symbols can be used by imposters. As a result, the "circulation of 
symbols" (p. 303) cannot be stopped and a "sign which is expressive for the class in 
which it originates comes to be employed by a different c)ass-a class for which the 
symbol can signify status but ill express it" (p. 304). 
Deception is also integral, of course, to the world of the confidence trickster that 
Goffman explored in "On Cooling the Mark Out" (1952). This paper attempts to 
take the structure of the confidence trick and show that it can be applied to any sit-
uation in which a person suffers a loss of status. In this sense, the paper constitutes 
an introduction to the sociology of failure. The "mark" is robbed of something and 
in return is given "instruction in the philosophy of taking a loss" (p. 452). 
The theme of deception is at the center of The Presentation of Self in Everyday 
Life, a book that could have easily and perhaps more appropriately been called The 
Misrepresentation of Self in Everyday Life. The dramaturgical vocabulary devel-
oped by Goffman concerning "impression management" offers a framework with 
which to understand the types and components of deception. The Presentation of 
Self is in a sense a textbook of deception. Thus, the chapter "Performances" de-
scribes techniques for the "dramatic realization" of manipulative presentations of 
self that actors build out of impressions and fronts that they design to mislead. 
Goffman (1959:40) illustrated this performance, using, among others, the example 
of a baseball umpire who must make his decisions immediately in order to give the 
impression of certainty, thereby forgoing the moment he needs to confirm his judg-
ments to himself. 
What is true of the individual performer is also true of the team. "The definition 
of the situation projected by a particular participant is an integral part of a projec-
tion that is fostered and sustained by the intimate cooperation of more than one 
participant" (1959:83). 
This definition of the situation gives every team the "character of a secret soci-
ety" in which their members all share the "sweet guilt of conspirators" (1959:108). 
This conspiracy is confirmed in the back regions away from public view where the 
team members' front stage performances are "knowingly contradicted" (1959:114). 
Dramaturgical deception requires more than impression management; perform-
ers must also show "dramaturgical discipline." 
It is crucial for the maintenance of the team's performance that each member of 
the team possess dramaturgical discipline and exercise it in presenting his own 
part. I refer to the fact that while the performer is ostensibly immersed and 
given over to the activity he is performing, and is apparently engrossed in his ac-
tions in a spontaneous, un calculating way, he must none the less be effectively 
dissociated from his presentation in a way that leaves him free to cope with 
dramaturgical contingencies as they arise. He must offer a show of intellectual 
and emotional involvement in the activity he is presenting, but must keep him-
self from actually being carried away by his own show lest this destroy his in-
volvement in the task of putting on a successful performance. (1959:210) 
In his early work, then, Goffman developed an analysis and a vocabulary of the 
ways in which people are able to mislead others by manipulating their assumptions 
about appearance and reality. 
Goffman's analysis of deception is also evident in his various analyses of indus-
trial spies, espionage agents, and rational choice dilemmas, all of which are promi-
nent in Encounters (1961b) and Strategic Interaction (1969) (a phrase he preferred 
to "symbolic interaction"). The essay "Expression Games," in the latter of these 
books, contains what is in effect Goffman's basic theory of deception. The essay 
ends with a justification for Goffman's strong interest in the espionage world: 
In every social situation we can find a sense in which one participant will be an 
observer with something to gain from asserting expressions, and another will be 
a subject with something to gain from manipUlating the process. A single struc-
ture of contingencies can be found in this regard which renders agents a little 
like us all and all of us a little like agents. (1969:81) 
Goffman drew this conclusion from his account of the basic moves involved in 
deception and counterdeception. These basic moves include the "unwitting," the 
"na'ive," the "covering," the "uncovering," and finally the "counter-uncovering" move 
(1969:11-27). They can be understood as a "set of tricky ways of sympathetically 
taking the other into consideration as someone who assesses the environment and 
might profitably be led into a wrong assessment" (1969:13). 
Later, in Frame Analysis, Goffman offered a theory of deception that combined 
these game-theory ideas with his dramaturgical perspective. In that work Goffman 
defined deception as consisting of the work done to ensure that "incorrect assump-
tions are initially made" (1974:440). In a manner reminiscent of The Presentation of 
Self, Frame Analysis contains a structural and almost textbook-like account of the 
resources available to those wishing to deceive. 
The key to Goffman's frame analysis is his belief that however we convince oth-
ers that we are as we appear to be, we use the same resources confidence tricksters 
use to deceive people: "[W]hatever we use as a means of checking up on claims pro-
vides a detailed recipe for those inclined to cook up reality" (1974:445). 
Goffman's idea that we "cook up reality" reconciles the apparent differences be-
tween his analyses of trust and deception by showing that both make use of the 
same mechanisms to succeed. The same resources we used to appear trustworthy 
are the ones we use for betrayal. Goffman was not, therefore, primarily interested 
in trust, ritual accommodation, or deception; rather, he focused on developing a 
theory of credibility. In short, Goffman analyzed the ways in which people make 
their performances convincingly real. 
A good test case for the possibility of analyzing how we make ourselves and our 
social settings convincingly real is interaction among the unacquainted. This setting 
might be simple enough to find a parsimonious account of the rules necessary to 
maintaining a sense that everything is as expected, that is, that "nothing" is really 
taking place. Thus children, comedians, and the mentally ill are so useful to sociolo-
gists: their lives reveal what Garfinkel (1967) called "breaching experiments" in 
that their behavior consistently involves rule violations. In these groups, often 
"something" (rather than the desired "nothing") is taking place, and the something 
is often disruptive, tiring, or embarrassing to someone present. Because of this, chil-
dren, comedians, and the mentally ill, among others, teach us by default what has to 
occur for people and social situations to be, or at least to appear, convincingly real. 
In this sense, Goffman's work attempted to understand the resources by which we 
maintain a shared sense of what the world is like. 
TENSIONS IN COFFMAN'S ACCOUNT OF THE SELF5 
The danger in focusing on the ways in which people sustain a credible world is that 
the people themselves begin to appear hollow. For the most part, Goffman pro-
vided us with a model of the structure of social interaction, not a model of the per-
forming agent. For example, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life indicates a 
lot about the presentation of self and not much about the self. As Wrong (1998:22-
3) argues, Goffman and most symbolic interactionists fail to offer a convincing ac-
count of what motivates people to do what they do. Prager (1998:70) makes a simi-
lar point when he suggests that a sociological focus on ritual deflects attention away 
from the analysis of the "interpreting self." 
Several commentators have recognized that Goffman often avoided analyzing the 
"inner world," or mental life, of people in favor of the structure of social interaction. 
Lyman and Scott (1975:107) state it well when they suggest that in The Presentation of 
Self, Goffman "moved the theater of performances out of the 'head' and into public 
places." More recently, Williams (1998:154) describes Goffman's position eloquently: 
He [Goffman] wanted to provide what he regarded as a distinctly sociological 
account of the person. In doing this, he treated as irrelevant the large variety of 
ways that people think about their own or other people's "inner lives." He was 
not concerned with individuals in the way that psychologists or novelists are 
when they attempt to display the full depth of human motivation, feeling, inten-
tion, unconsciousness and so on .... To understand the self sociologically it had 
to be approached as a social institution, and researched by observing and analyz-
ing externally observable forms of conduct.6 
In the Verhoeven interview, Goffman was unusually candid about his analysis of 
the self, describing his research in a way that confirms the assessments by Lyman 
and Scott, Williams, Wrong, and Prager: 
What I'm doing is the structural Social Psychology that is required, or is natural 
for, Sociology. That is, given Sociology is a central thrust, what can it say about 
the individual? Not that the individual is the central unit that permits us to study 
society; but if you take society as the basic and substantive unit ... what is it we 
have to assume about individuals, so that they can be used or be usable socially? 
... I am an ethnographer of small entities. (1993:322-23) 
He added later: 
[S]ociologists in some ways have always believed in the social construction of re-
ality. The issue is, at what level is the reality socially constructed? ... But where I 
differ from social constructionists is that I don't think the individual himself or 
herself does much of the constructing. (1993:324) 
This passage suggests that Goffman deliberately downplayed the importance of an-
alyzing the interpreting self in favor of an analysis of the interpreted self. A more 
skillfully worded version of this idea can be found in the frequently cited introduc-
tion to Interaction Ritual: 
I assume that the proper study of interaction is not the individual and his psy-
chology, but rather the syntactical relations among the acts of different persons 
mutually present to one another .... What minimal model of the actor is needed 
if we are to wind him up, stick him in amongst his fellows, and have an orderly 
traffic of behavior emerge? ... 
Not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men. (1967:2-3) 
However, as I will suggest, this "minimal model" strategy is largely reversed in his 
investigations of the behavior of the mentally ill, in which a more elaborate analysis 
of the self emerges. 
Although Goffman wrote extensively about deceiving others, he wrote almost 
nothing about self-deception. Perhaps this omission is tacitly acknowledged by his 
allusion to Freud's The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1956) in the title of his 
own The Presentation ofSelf in Everyday Life. Insofar as Freud was the leading the-
orist of self-deception, perhaps Goffman saw his own work as complementing 
rather than competing with Freud's psychoanalytic investigations. Some evidence 
exists for this claim. Wrong recalls: 
Once he [Goffman] defended Freud's emphasis on the body and the priority of 
infant experience against the more congenial neo-Freudian culturalists we fa-
vored. His later antipathy to psychoanalysis is well known, but he created in me 
the first small twinge of doubt as to whether there was not more truth and pro-
fundity in the vision of the founder than in all the Erich Fromms, Karen Hor-
neys, and Gordon Allports who were so ready to revise him. (1990:9) 
According to Wrong, at least in the early 1950s Goffman not only knew about 
Freud but also willingly defended psychoanalytic claims. However, it is also true, as 
Wrong also indicates above, that the tone of Goffman's published comments about 
psychoanalysis ranges mainly from the critical to the hostile, although these well-
informed comments indicated his extensive psychoanalytic knowledge.? 
Nonetheless, any appeal to complementarity between Freud's analysis of self-
deception and Goffman's analysis of deception is fraught with difficulty. Every dis~ 
cussion of deception implies the promise of a knowable world. This implication 
makes detective and spy stories appealing: at the end everything is explained and 
fits neatly into place. By contrast, Freud's analysis of self-deception only promises 
to reveal fragments of an unknowable world and an unknowable self. Psychoanaly-
sis can only partially recover unconscious wishes. At one point, Freud (1926) lik-
ened psychoanalysis to the recovery of flooded land: the role of the analyst is to 
push the water, the id, back as far as possible, thus preserving as much of the self as 
possible for the ego. But the project is only ever partial and temporary. 
Goffman's preference for theoretical abstraction, although well hidden amid re-
vealing examples, made it difficult for him to offer an adequate theory of selfhood. 
He made tremendous progress in understanding the resources used by people to 
preserve or manipulate a shared sense of what is taking place, but he did so at the 
expense of a viable account of the people who use these resources. Goffman's role-
analytic account places the self in danger of collapsing into its roles. It becomes, in 
an infamous phrase, a peg on which something can be put for a while. In this sense, 
Goffman offers us something quite different from Freud. 
The secondary literature contains important and in many ways consistent criti-
cisms of Goffman's account of the self. The model of the self in The Presentation of 
Selfand the chapter "Role Distance" in Encounters (1961b) suggests that our public 
performances are all that we are. Nothing underlies these performances, except per-
haps a necessary fiction of a unified self. But Goffman suggests that it is just a fiction. 
He presents a radically de-personalized world in which we are simultaneously per-
former and audience: we hear our own disembodied voices as disembedded cries, 
and we watch ourselves perform in a frightening version of the looking glass self. 
In one sense, these criticisms are misplaced. Goffman's analysis of the interac-
tion order does not require a theory of the self, as his main focus concerned the 
ground rules or enabling conventions that people use in daily life. He analyzed the 
resources people use in managing daily living rather than the people who use them. 
Because the interaction order analyzes the structure of group life, it remains sepa-
rate from the individual members of groups. This argument is recognizably Durk-
heimian and one that Goffman himself might readily have accepted as a reasonable 
account of both sociology in general and his own work in particular. Nevertheless, 
Goffman also succumbed at times to a theory of the self, or, more accurately, to dif-
ferent theories of the self. 
His most criticized theory of the self arose out of his role analysis, where, in his 
attempt to integrate "role distance" into a distinctly sociological rather than psy-
chological theory, he argued that actors play out selves in their different perfor-
mances. For example, MacIntyre (1982:30) has complained that Goffman has "liq-
uidated the self into its role-playing," adding that for Goffman the critical mistake is 
to "suppose that there is a substantial self over and beyond the complex presenta-
tions of role-playing" (p. 31). MacIntyre suggests that, for Goffman, the social world 
is "everything," permitting only a "ghostly'!''' with almost no selfhood (p.31). 
Jonathan Glover (1988) has also explored and criticized Goffman's role theory. 
Glover notes that Goffman's analysis suggests that "the things we do which seem to 
escape from social roles are themselves refinements to these roles" (1988:171). In 
response, Glover claims: 
Of course we are shaped by people's expectations of us, and of course these vary 
with our job, our sex, our age, and so on. But it is an illusion to think that we are 
utterly malleable, submitting entirely to social molding. This picture might fit 
people who had no inner story. They would have no conception of themselves 
apart from the conception other people had. They would lack desires and values 
in the light of which to criticize the demands made of them, and would have no 
independent views about how their story should continue. We arr not such peo-
ple. (1988:175) 
Glover's suggestion that Goffman's model of the person implies someone who 
has no "inner story" connects with MacIntyre's (1982:108-10) sense that Goffman's 
world is amoral. It also resonates with Sennett's (1970:36) belief that Goffman de-
scribes a two-dimensional world in which there are scenes but no plots. 
Frame Analysis contains a description of the self that is quite compatible with 
these critical readings. Here, Goffman suggested that we all endeavor to understand 
people using what he. calls a "tacit theory of expression" (1974:462). This theory as-
sumes that there are things such as relationships, feelings, and character, and that 
they are revealed in various ways. Goffman, however, implies that this theory is 
quite wrong. Instead he suggests that all we have are just "expressions and gestural 
equipment" for providing certain kinds of displays-and this equipment can easily 
be used either to convey genuine feeling or to deceive. 
Although this tacit model of the self runs through much of his work, Goffman 
also used another, more suggestive model that is compatible with Glover's insis-
tence that we have an "inner story." This second model of the self is prominent in 
Goffman's writings about both the nature of mental illness and the institutionaliza-
tion and treatment of the mentally ill. Although Asylums contains his most sus-
tained investigation of these topics, Goffman investigated and wrote about mental 
illness throughout his career (Gronfein 1999; Manning 1999a). Perhaps Goffman's 
most poignant paper is "The Insanity of Place" (1971, in Relations in Public) in 
which, in his characteristically neutral tone, he described the difficulties of living 
with someone who is mentally ill, in a thinly veiled reference to his own experiences 
with his first wife.8 
In Asylums, Goffman is often anxious to promote the idea that patients in mental 
hospitals act in ways similar to inmates in a variety of total institutions. In Asylums 
and elsewhere, he suggests that psychiatrists often misidentify the resourceful ways 
in which their patients adapt to the threatening experience of the hospital as symp-
toms of underlying illness. In his most direct analysis of this issue, Goffman (1963:216-
41) argues that psychiatrists need but don't have a way of distinguishing symptom-
atic from nonsymptomatic situational improprieties. Without this distinction, the 
psychiatrist can misidentify a "secondary adjustment" as a medical symptom. 
Elsewhere (1999a) I have argued that significant aspects of Goffman's analysis of 
mental illness contain what Woolgar and Pawluch (1985) call "ontological gerry-
mandering." This is because Goffman frequently (albeit tacitly) claimed to analyze 
mental illness from a privileged space from which he could see mental illness as it 
"really" is. This implies that his understanding of mental illness exceeds that of the 
psychiatric profession, but he does not explain why his view of mental illness super-
sedes prevailing medical doctrine. Arguably, Goffman's advocacy (even if misplaced) 
of a "super psychiatry" (Manning 1999a:98) shows the strength of his belief in an 
ethnography-based sociology. 
Despite doubts about some of Goffman's arguments concerning mental illness, 
they contain a much richer implicit theory of selfhood than the one embedded in his 
analysis of roles. His analysis of "secondary adjustments" particularly reveals its po-
tential. To theorize the role of secondary adjustments in all total institutions, Goff-
man had to incorporate an elaborate theory of the self that could show how inmates 
draw on inner resources to withstand oppressive institutional conditions. The third es-
say of Asylums is a long and often poignant tribute to the many ways inmates find to 
preserve their integrity and sense of worth. Ironically, then, to criticize what he saw as 
the paucity of orthodox psychiatry's account of the self, Goffman had to develop a 
more sophisticated theory than many of his role-theoretic formulations allowed. 
My earlier characterization of Goffman's analysis of the interaction order as an 
analysis of the conditions of credibility gives us a way of understanding how Goffman 
could slip into a theory in which the self has been liquidated. What is credible mayor 
may not be true: Goffman was primarily interested in the resources whereby some-
thing can be made to seem true. Insofar as Goffman focused on these resources, the 
person is likely to appear-by default-as a cynical manipulator of impressions. 
THEORETICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENT  
OF COFFMAN'S IDEAS  
In this article, I have advocated a reading of Goffman that suggests that his ideas 
about the interaction order and deception converge into an analysis of the produc-
tion and reproduction of credibility. Maintaining credibility involves the use of vari-
ous kinds of resources and a willingness to abide by rules of conduct. When the so-
cial world is credible it is "convincingly real," which, in the context of everyday 
behavior, often means that participants have a sense that "nothing" in particular is 
going on. That is, the setting and the people in it appear unremarkable, in the sense 
of not being worthy of a remark. I have also suggested that interaction among the 
unacquainted is not only a substantive topic in its own right but also a test case for 
the ability of sociological analysis to describe the rules and resources underlying a 
relatively simple and frequently occurring social practice. It is relatively simple in 
the sense that managing a stranger in a shopping mall should be simpler than, for 
example, managing a friendship that has not just a present but also a history and a 
projected future. 
For the most part, Goffman's work contains a sustained attempt to analyze what 
he called the enabling conventions of the interaction order, or what I have described 
as the conditions of credibility. Goffman wanted to show that the interaction order 
is an autonomous realm that can be analyzed separately and in its own terms. De-
scribed in this way, Goffman did not need a theory of the self. 
However, Goffman discovered that he needed a theory of the self when he ana-
lyzed aspects of mental illness and institutionalization. Thus, Asylums and related 
papers differ theoretically from his general analyses of face-to-face interaction, in 
that they contain a potentially viable theory of the self. Goffman needed this theory 
so that he could investigate what might be called the inmates' "strategies of resis-
tance" embedded in various secondary adjustments. To further his account of the be-
havior of patients at St. Elizabeth's Goffman had to draw on what he often rejected, 
namely, a theory of an "inner core" to the self that is expressed in various perfor-
mances and which stretches between them. 
Goffman's analysis in Asylums is so compelling because it finally contains both 
"scenes" and a "plot," to replay Sennett's comment on Goffman. Asylums also dis-
plays a rich qualitative methodology: I have described this as an "ethnography of 
concepts." Perhaps, then, Goffman's social theory can be further developed by link-
ing his analysis of the interaction order to the theory of the self, found in his writ-
ings about mental illness. I take this to be one of the directions of Giddens's structu-
ration project. Giddens's specific contribution to our understanding of interpretive 
sociology has initiated what Turner (1988:46-49) has called a "psychoanalytic soci-
ology." This approach points toward an integration of symbolic interactionism and a 
version of psychoanalytic ideas that Harry Stack Sullivan and others first proposed 
in the 1920s and 1930s. The "qualitative," nonexperimental, hermeneutic, Case study 
approach of psychoanalysis promised then to be and perhaps still is compatible with 
many of the assumptions underlying symbolic interactionism. Giddens's contempo-
rary synthesis is more sophisticated than anything imagined by Chicago sociologists 
and psychiatrists of the 1920s and 1930s, as it is grounded in both the "object-
relations" school of psychoanalysis and the American pragmatist tradition of Mead, 
Goffman, and Erikson. Giddens's work could usefully be combined with Chodorow's 
(1999) most recent writings on object relations. 
The integration of an analysis of the interaction order and a sophisticated theory 
of the self offers a critical theoretical development to both Goffman's work and 
symbolic interactionism. It promises to provide a way of analyzing not only the en-
abling conventions of the interaction order but also the people who use them. 
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NOTES 
1. 	 Goffman also retained an interest in antiques throughout his life and enjoyed traveling to Eu-
rope on buying sprees (Marx 1984). 
2. 	 One of the most important readings of Goffman and his relationship to the ideas of both Chi-
cago sociology and ethnomethodology remains Lyman and Scott's A Sociology of the Absurd 
(1970). 
3. 	For readers familiar only with what I am calling the American Goffman, the comparison with 
Parsons may seem mystifying. It is worth rereading the final essay of Asylums in which Goff-
man explicitly acknowledges his debt to Parsons. 
4. 	 Useful background information to Lofland's argument can be found in Ortiz (1994) and Sorkin 
(1992), particularly Crawford's fine paper. 
5. 	 One of the most detailed examinations of this tension remains the unpublished paper by Greg 
Smith (1999) of the University of Salford. See his "The Proprieties of Persondom: The Individ-
ual in the Writings of Erving Goffman" presented at the 1999 Couch-Stone Symposium. 
6. 	 In his paper, Williams (1998:155) distinguishes three accounts of the self in Goffman's work. 
His analysis could be usefully compared to the view I outline in this section. 
7. 	It may also be worth adding that at Chicago Goffman was romantically involved with Elizabeth 
Bott (now Elizabeth Bott Spillius), who has since become a leading psychoanalyst. 
8. 	 For this and many other insights into Goffman's life and work, I am indebted to Yves Winkin. 
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